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STATE OF NEW YORK
SUPREME COURT

COUNTY OF ALBANY

In the Matter of the Application of
MORRIS HOWARD, 75-A-2675,
Petitioner,
DECISION AND ORDER
For a Judgment Pursuant to Article 78
of the Civil Practice Law and Rules,

Index No. 298-03
RJI # 01-03-ST3308
-againstBRION D. TRAVIS, Chairman of the
New York State Board of Parole,
Respondent.

(Suprenie COu.rt,._.Al oany-county, Spec1arTerm; February 28, 2003)
APPEARANCES:

BENNET GOODMAN, ESQ.
Attorney for Petitioner
1428 Midland Avenue
Suite 6
Bronxville, New York 10708-6042
ELIOT SPITZER, ESQ.
Attorney General, State of New York
Attorney for Respondent
(Stephen M. Kerwin, Esq.
Assistant Attorney General of Counsel)
The Capitol
Albany, New York 12224

Leslie E. Stein, J.:

Petitioner commenced the instant CPLR Article 78 proceeding to review a determination
made on September 5, 2001, denying him parole release for the third time and imposing a 24month hold. Petitioner filed an administrative appeal, which ·affirmed the determiqation of the ·

. ..

parole board. Therefore, his .administrative remedies were deemed exhausted. Petitioner asserts
that the Board's determination was arbitrary and capricious and requests an Order directing
respondent to grant him a new parole release hearing before t'ire:'fiexf avaiJal;iJe Board and to
release him on parole supervision.

In his answer to the petition, respondent requested dismissal of the petition, raised an
objection in point of law that petitioner has waived his Claims by failing to raise his objections
administratively and raised the following defenses: ~hat the decision of the parole board was
reached in full compliance with all statutory and regulatory requirements and must be sustained
by the Court; and that the petition fails to state viable cause of action.
'-

Petitioner alleges he is serving a twenty-five year to life sentence for incidents that
occurred over 27 years ago, at a time when he was heavily addicted to drugs, and that he is now
57 years old and has been imprisoned for over 25 years. He alleges that he is an exceptional
inmate who has fully rehabilitated himself. Petitioner has submitted a memorandum from the
Superintendent of the facility where he is incarcerated, requesting special consideration for a
rehearing from a previous denial of parole, as well as two volumes of letters attesting to
petitioner's rehabilitation and in support of his release. In addit.i on, petitioner has supplied
copies of certificates, diplomas and awards that he has earned while incarcerated. Petitioner
alleges that he has num~rous employment opportunities if released and that he has extensive and
caring family support.
Petitioner alleges that the prior two denials of parole were based upon his past criminal
history, with no consideration of any other factors. He further asserts that the Board denied
parole release at his most recent hearing exclusively on the nature and circumstances of his
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underlying offenses and remote criminal history, that the Board had predetermined the case and
that the denial of parole was improper because it failed to consider all of the statutory factors set
forth in Executive Law §259-i(2)(c).
Respondent argues that the following issues raised by petitioner in this p"'focfeeding were
deemed waived because they were not raised in his administrative appeal: that the decision was
based on the wrong standard; that it was predetennined; that its effect was.to illegally resentence
petitioner in violation of the doctrine of separation of powers and double jeopardy; that it
was a violation of due process because of political policies; and that the 24 month hold is
excessive. A review of petitioner's administrative appeal brief demonstrates that he did argue
'-

that the decision was not based on the proper standards. Therefore; that issue has not been
waived(~

Watergate v Buffalo Sewer, 46 NY2d 52, 57). However, the other issues were not

raised in the administrative appeal and, therefore, may not be raised for the first time in this
proceeding (see Walker v New York State D iv. of Parole, 203 AD2d 757).
Respondent argues that petitioner does not have a guaranteed right to parole and that the
record demonstrates that the Board was aware of petitioner's achievements and decided that the
nature of the crime outweighed petitioner's positive adjustments. Respondent also asserts that
the Board may consider the potential danger an imnate would pose to the community if the
inmate were to be released and may deny release if it detennines that such release would
undermine respect for the law and deprecate the seriousness of the crime. Respondent further
argues that it is within the Parole Board's discretion to hold petitioner beyond the minimum
sentence as long as it sets forth its reasons for doing so. Respondent asserts that the 24-month
hold imposed by the Board is standard treatment for individuals denied parole and was not
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excessive, that the decision was sufficiently detailed so as to inform petitioner as to the reasons
for the denial of parole and that it satisfied the criteria set forth in Executive Law §259-i. Thus,
respondent argues that petitioner has failed to demonstrate that the Board viol,al.¢~.any P<?Sitive
. ..:
statutory mandate in the rejection of his application for parole and asserts t~'B'oar~rl·
determination was not arbitrary and capriciou?.

In reply, petitioner argues that the Court has a responsi~ility to strictly review the Board
decisions to ensure that there is a logical nexus between the underlying offense and a finding that
there is a reasonable probability that if an inmate is released he will not remain at liberty without
violating the law or that his release is incompatible with the welfare of society or will so
'-

deprecate the seriousness of the crime as to undermine respect for the law, as set forth in
Executive Law§ 259-i[2][c]. Petitioner argues that noting achievements is not tantamount to
considering them in a fair and reasoned individualized manner.

It is well established that "[p]arole release decisions are discretionary and, if made
pursuant to statutory requirements, are not reviewable" (Matter of Sinopoli v New York State
Bd. of Parole, 189 AD2d 960, 960, citing Matter of McKee v New York State Bd. of Parole, 157
AD2d 944; see.Ristau v Hammock, 103 ~2d 944). It is proper arid, in fact, required that the
Parole Board consider the seriousness of the inmate's crimes and their violent nature (see, Matter
of Weir v New York State Div. of Parole, 205 AD2d 906, 907; Matter of Sinopoli v New York
State Bd. of Parole, supra; Matter of Dudley v Brown, 227 AD2d 863, as well as the inmate's
criminal history (see, Matter of Farid v Travis, 239 AD2d 629; Matter of Cohen v Gonzalez, 254
AD2d 556). The Parole Board is not required to enumerate or give equal weight to each factor
that is considered in determining the inmate's application (see, Matter of Farid v Travis, supra;
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Matter of Moore v New York State Bd. of Parole, 233 AD2d 653) and Executive Law§ 259i(2)(c) does not require that parole release be granted merely as a reward for appellant's good
conduct or achievements while incarcerated (Matter of Larrier v New York State Bd. of Parole
Appeals Unit, 283 AD2d 700).
However, in the instant matter, it appears that the Parole Board applied the incorrect
standard and did not truly consider the relevant criteria in making its decision. Furthennore, the
decision was not sufficiently detailed to inform petitioner of the reasons for the denial of parole
and it does not satisfy the requirements of Executive Law §259-i (cf Matter of Whitehead v
Russi, 201AD2d825; Matter of Green v New York State Div. of Parole, 199 AD2d 677).
Specifically, while it is widisputed that the underlying crimes were serious and violent,
they occurred ifyears ago arid were c-oupledWlth a substance abuse problem. Rather than
considering whether petitioner "will live and remain at liberty without violating the law, and that
his release is not incompatible with the welfare of society and will not so deprecate the
seriousness of his crime as to widennine respect for law" (Executive Law § 259-i[2][c]), the
Board's determination indicates that it concluded that "discretionary release does not serve
societies[sic] interests and further incarceration protects society". There is no indication that
petitioner currently has

anx substance abuse problems and neither the record nor the decision

indicates how petitioner's release is incompatible with ~he welfare of society, that he would be
likely to commit another crime, or that his release would undennine respect for the law. In f~ct,
there are no negative factors that the Board could have considered other than the nature of the
underlying offense and there are many factors which indicate that parole should be granted,
including the fact that petitioner has been instrumental in quelling riots and facilitating good
relations-between inmates and prison administration officials.
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Based upon the foregoing, the Court concludes that respondent's determination was made
in violation of lawful procedure, is affected by an error of law and is irrational, arbitrary and
capricious, and an abuse of discretion.
Accordingly it is

ORDERED and ADJUDGED, that the petition is granted to the extent that the matter is
remanded for a new parole release hearing before the next available Board.
This shall constitute the Decision and Order of the Court. All papers are returned to the
attorney for petitioner, who is directed to enter this Decision and Order without notice and to
serve respondent with a copy of this Decision and Order ~th notice of entry.

SO ORDERED!
ENTER.
Dated: July 9, 2003
Albany, New York

Papers Considered:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.

Order to Show Cause dated January 17, 2003;
Verified Petition dated December 4, 20.02, with exhibits annexed;
Respondent's Answer dated February 12, 2003, with exhibits annexed;
Affirmation of Stephen M. Kerwin, Esq., dated February 12, 2003;
Reply Affirmation of Bennet Goodman, Esq. dated April 19, 2003, with exhibit
annexed.
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